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Recent Cases
CnmiuwA LAw - FAmueX To REQUEST CouNSL - ESCOBEDO DISTIN-
GUSHED - Appellant was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment
upon conviction of armed robbery. His court-appointed attorney,
relying on Escobedo v. Illinois,' contended that the use at his trial of
incriminating statements obtained during interrogation of the appellant
prior to preliminary examination 2 constituted plain error requiring
reversal. It does not appear in the record that the appellant was advised
of his right to remain silent and that any statement made by him might
be used against him. Held: Affirmed. The court distinguished Esco-
bedo on the grounds that the appellant had failed to request counsel,
holding, "[U] nless his right to counsel was established by the denial of
a request by defendant for an opportunity with his lawyer or a lawyer,
he had no such right which could have been the subject of waiver."
United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448, 450 (7th Cir. 1965).
In a similar cases the Illinois Supreme Court held that Escobedo did
not apply unless the suspect requested counsel.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
decided the issue differently. There4 the appellant, while in police
custody, but prior to either preliminary hearing or indictment, con-
fessed. He had not been advised of his rights and had not requested
counsel. The court held that the appellant had been denied his right
to counsel and reversed. The court stated:
We can perceive no sound basis for holding that request for counsel
is a prerequisite for the right to counsel at the interrogation stage while
it is not at the other.... No sound reasoning that we can discover will
support the conclusion that although at other stages in the proceeding in
which the right attaches there must be an intelligent waiver, at the
interrogation level a failure to request counsel may be deemed a waiver.
The court cited People v. Dorado,5 a similar case, in which the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held:
1378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2 In Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 338-39 n.2(a) (D.C. Cir.
1960), the court observed: "We have here used the'terminology into which the
courts and the bar have drifted over a period of years, which inaccurately describes
as an arraignment' the 'appearance before the Commissioner' under Rule 5, Fed.
R. Crim. P. The hearing called for by Rule 5, is not an 'arraignment' but a pre-
limina ry examination of the arrested person." In this article 'preliminary exami-
nation" and "arraignment" will not be used interchangeably.
3 People v. Hartgraves, 31 IMi. App. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964).
4 United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3rd Cir. 1965).
540 Cal. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964).
BEcENT CASES
[T]he right to counsel precludes the use of incriminating statements
elicited by the police unless that right is intelligently waived.. . .No
waiver can be presumed if the investigating officers do not inform the
suspect of his right to counsel or his right to remain silent.6
The supreme courts of two of the states in the Third Circuit have
reached conflicting conclusions on whether to follow its decision.
7
The New Jersey Supreme Court has refused to follow it,8 declar-
ing, "there is parallelism but not paramountcy" between state and
lower federal courts in deciding constitutional questions.9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which had previously decided
in several cases10 that while in police custody a suspect must request
counsel even when not advised of his rights, acquiesced to the decision
of the Third Circuit," stating:
The decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is on this matter,
for all practical purposes, the ultimate forum in Pennsylvania. If the
Pennsylvania courts refuse to abide by its conclusions, then the indivi-
dual to whom we deny relief need only to "walk across the street" to
obtain a different result. Such an unfortunate situation would cause
disrespect for the law.
12
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in four cases'4 involving
interpretations of Escobedo. One' 4 of these deals with the issue dis-
cussed here. It is expected that the Court will greatly clarify Escobedo
in its decisions of these cases.
While the Escobedo holding 5 was narrowly restricted to the facts
of that case, its sweeping dicta indicated that in the future the Court
may find a right to counsel prior to preliminary hearing in practically
any factual circumstances where the suspect has not been advised of
his rights. Many lower courts,' realizing the enormous difficulties a
broad interpretation of Escobedo would present, have distinguished the
640 Cal. 264,268, 394 P.2d 952, 954 (1964).
7 See, 9 Defender News Letter (July 6, 1965).
3 Ibid.
0 State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965).
10 Linde v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965); Commonwealth v.
Patrick, 416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295 (1965).
" United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).
12 Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965).
13 Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. granted,
:328 U.S. 924 (1965) (No. 80, Misc., 1965 Term; renumbered No. 761, 1966
Term); Miranda v. Arizona, 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721 (1965), cert. granted,
328 U.S. 925 (1965) (No. 419 Misc., 1965 Term; renumbered No. 759, 1966
Term); Johnson v. New Jersey, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737 (1965), cert. granted,
328 U.S. 925 (1965) (No. 205 Misc., 1965 Term; renumbered No. 762, 1966
Term); Vignera v. New York, 15 N.Y.2d 970, 259 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1965), cert.
granted, 328 U.S. 925 (1965) (No. 397 Misc., 1965 Term; renumbered No. 760
1966 Term).
'4 Vignera v. New York, supra note 13.
'5378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
16 See, People v. Hartgraves,31 Il. App. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964).
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case because the suspect did not request counsel. However, their
decision to distinguish it on this basis is unfortunate, for they would
now be hard pressed to uphold a conviction in a case which was
identical except that the suspect did request counsel. Prior to pre-
liminary hearing, there is little that counsel could do, if present, except
to advise the suspect of his right to remain silent. The suspect who
requests counsel is probably already aware of this right while he who
fails to request is probably unaware of it. Thus, the holding of these
cases' may be referred to as the "gangster theory of Escobedo," aiding
those who are experienced in the methods of police interrogation while
discriminating against those who are ignorant.
It may be hoped that the Supreme Court will overrule Escobedo
or at least strictly limit it to its facts. The only alternative is a sweeping
decision that the suspect is entitled to an absolute right to counsel
from the moment he is apprehended by the police. Any intermediate
decision will undoubtedly be resisted and "watered down" by some
courts and expanded by others, resulting in a lack of uniformity of the
law and the decline in public respect for the law which will inevitably
follow.
Such a broad interpretation of Escobeda would present insur-
mountable difficulties. Law enforcement officers would be obliged to
retain an attorney for every suspect and lawyers would find them-
selves literally "walking the beat" with the police, and every suspect
would have to be subjected to the indignities of "booking" because his
attorney would demand that he be either charged or released im-
mediately.
A reasonable alternative is available. If an absolute affirmative duty
were placed upon the state to advise' s a suspect of his right to remain
silent and that any information he volunteers may be used against
him, there is no need for counsel at this time.
The Court could insure that this duty would be fulfilled by insisting
that preliminary hearings be made available twenty-four hours a day
throughout the country and that the suspect, upon apprehension, be
taken immediately before a magistrate or commissioner, who would
advise him of these rights19 and that any incriminating statement he
made prior to that time would be ipso facto "involuntary."20
17 Ibid.
18 Professor Gerhard 0. W. Mueller of New York University has suggested
that the considerable talents of "Madison Avenue" might be employed to perform
this function.
'9 This result could be obtained by an extension of the holding of Mallory v.
United States, 854 U.S. 449 (1957).
20 For an interpretation of the Mallory case which could serve as a precedent
for such a decision see Tudge Bazelon's concurring opinion in Trilling v. United
States, 260 F.2d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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To guard against "coerced confessions," the magistrate should also be
present at all times when the suspect is being interrogated. This system
would elevate magistrates to the status of more useful public officials,
would relieve attorneys of the overwhelming burden which may other-
wise be cast upon them, would reduce or eliminate appeals on the
basis of "right to counsel" and "coerced confession," and would insure
the rights of the suspect prior to arraignment.
21
Paul W. Blair
EvmENCE-INTERNAL REVENUE CODE-ADMISSIBILTY OF ILLEGALLY-OB-
TAmiND EVIDENCE.-An information under section 7203 of title 26 United
States Code' was filed against defendants charging each with failure to
file income tax returns for two taxable years. Subsequently an indict-
ment under section 7201 of title 26 United States Code2 was returned
against defendants charging each with willful tax evasion. Before the
trial defendants moved to suppress for use as evidence against them
certain files, records and information seized by means of a compulsory
process directed at one Birrell. The court reserved decision on all
issues raised by the motion and the case proceeded to trial. The jury
failed to reach a verdict and the judge declined to decide the reserved
motion.
In another court, Birrell moved to have the seized documents sup-
pressed as evidence against him and returned to him, and to have
various indictments against him dismissed. Neither the indictment
nor the information that charged defendants, charged Birrell, and
therefore, neither was made the subject of Birrell's motion. A decision
on Birrell's motion was reserved by the court.
Upon assignment of the information and indictment against de-
fendants to the United States district court for the southern district of
New York, defendants renewed their motion to suppress, and, in
21 See, supra note 2.
1 Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or
required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a
return. .. keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pa
such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply suc
information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
2 Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other
penalties by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with costs of prosecution.
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